# **GLOBAL ZERO ACTION PLAN** FEBRUARY, 2010



A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS

# GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION

DR. JACQUES ATTALI AMB. K. SHANKAR BAJPAI AMB. ALEXANDER BESSMERTNYKH AMB. RICHARD BURT PM YASUO FUKUDA SEN. CHUCK HAGEL AMB. WOLFGANG ISCHINGER GEN. (RET.) JEHANGIR KARAMAT AMB. SHAHARYAR KHAN ANTHONY LAKE SEN. MIKHAIL MARGELOV COL. GEN. (RET.) EVGENY MASLIN Amb. Brajesh Mishra Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Peng Guangqian Amb. Thomas Pickering Sir Malcolm Rifkind Amb. Yukio Satoh Gen. (Ret.) Jack Sheehan Air Chf. Mshl. (Ret.) SP Tyagi Dr. Evgeny Velikhov Amb. Wu Jianmin Dr. Yang Jiemian Igor Yurgens

The Commission is part of the Global Zero initiative – an international, nonpartisan effort formed in response to the growing threats of proliferation and nuclear terrorism and dedicated to achieving the phased, verified elimination of all nuclear weapons. Global Zero is spearheaded by a group of more than 200 leaders worldwide, including many who have worked at senior levels with issues of national security such as former heads of state, foreign ministers, defense ministers, national security advisors and top military commanders.

# **DEFINITIONS:**

Nuclear Weapons Countries

Countries with nuclear weapons.

#### Nuclear Capable Countries

Countries with nuclear weapons, weapons-grade fissile materials, uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities, or nuclear power or research reactors.

## **OVERVIEW**

We, the members of the Global Zero Commission, with the benefit of our collective experience working on national security issues in many of the key nuclear and non-nuclear countries, have come to believe that whatever stabilizing impact nuclear weapons had during the Cold War, any residual benefits of these arsenals are now overshadowed by the growing risk of proliferation and the related risk of nuclear terrorism. The world is nearing a "proliferation tipping point" when nuclear weapons spread beyond the capacity of any effort to rein them in and the danger increases that they will be used by a country in conflict or by accident, or by a terrorist group. The only way to eliminate the nuclear threat is to achieve the phased, verified, multilateral elimination of all nuclear weapons – global zero.

In April 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev issued an historic joint statement committing their "two countries to achieving a nuclear free world" and subsequently announced a framework agreement for new reductions in U.S. and Russian arsenals. In September, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution calling for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. There is a growing international nonpartisan consensus among political leaders, security experts and publics in support of this goal. Today, the overwhelming majority of nations -184 – do not have nuclear weapons.

As Presidents Obama and Medvedev and other leaders begin to pursue the important near-term measures they have outlined – all of which we fully endorse – we are developing a practical, end-to-end strategy, including near-, medium- and long-term steps, for the phased, verified, multilateral and proportionate reduction of all nuclear weapons to zero. We have outlined a four-phased process for the preparation, negotiation, ratification and implementation of a legally binding international agreement for eliminating all nuclear weapons ("global zero accord"). The fulfillment of this universal agreement will achieve the verified total elimination of nuclear weapons, establish the necessary measures of strict enforcement, and permanently prohibit any country from developing, possessing or using nuclear weapons.

We are conducting a hard-nosed, realistic and thorough examination of the critical conditions that must be met at each stage in the process.

The key elements of the four phases:

- Phase 1 (2010 2013)
  - Following the conclusion of a START replacement accord, negotiate a bilateral accord for the U.S. and Russia to reduce to 1,000 total warheads each (to be implemented by 2018).
  - Earlier if possible, but not later than the ratification of the U.S.-Russia bilateral accord, all other nuclear weapons countries freeze the total number of warheads in their arsenals and commit to participate in multilateral negotiations for proportionate reductions of stockpiles (as outlined in Phase 2).
  - Prepare for multilateral negotiations.
- Phase 2 (2014 2018)
  - In a multilateral framework, the U.S. and Russia reach agreement to reduce to 500 total warheads each (to be implemented by 2021) as long as all other nuclear weapons countries agree to maintain the freeze on their stockpiles until 2018, followed by proportionate reductions until 2021.
  - Establish a comprehensive verification and enforcement system, including nonotice, on-site inspections.
  - Strengthen safeguards on the civilian nuclear fuel cycle to prevent diversion of materials to build weapons.
- Phase 3 (2019 2023)
  - Negotiate a global zero accord: a legally binding international agreement, signed by all nuclear capable countries, for the phased, verified, proportionate reduction of all nuclear arsenals to zero total warheads by 2030.
- Phase 4 (2024 2030)
  - Complete the phased, verified, proportionate dismantlement of all nuclear arsenals to zero total warheads by 2030, and continue the comprehensive verification and enforcement system prohibiting the development and possession of nuclear weapons.

While all nuclear capable countries must sign and ratify the global zero accord for it to enter into force, it is not necessary for all of them to participate at the outset of the diplomatic process. Countries may join the process at any point during the preparation, negotiation and ratification phases. This phased approach will allow for the steady expansion of participation, achieving

universality over time while preventing any holdouts or temporary withdrawals from derailing the process.

In pursuing global zero, nations will confront profound and complex political and security issues. Before signing and ratifying a global zero accord, nations will assess whether going to zero will serve their national interests, taking into consideration the state of various geopolitical, regional and national security issues at that time. The Commission will continue to examine these issues and their interrelationship with our strategy for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

In a political endeavor as dynamic and complex as the pursuit of global zero, no one can predict success or failure of any stage of the process, nor of the ultimate objective. We can be certain, however, that in the absence of a comprehensive end-to-end plan, including a realistic examination of the conditions that must be met at every stage, we cannot succeed – the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons will remain a distant vision beyond reach as the world drifts toward a "proliferation tipping point" and nuclear catastrophe.

Eliminating all nuclear weapons cannot happen quickly. It will take years of technical, diplomatic and political preparation before negotiations on an agreement for eliminating nuclear weapons can even begin – and many more years to negotiate and implement it. In short, this will be a very long and difficult process – the sooner we start down the road to zero, the sooner we may end the nuclear threat. Indeed, if we delay getting started, we may reach the proliferation tipping point when it may be too late.

Furthermore, beginning serious talks on the elimination of nuclear weapons would have immediate security benefits. Although nuclear aspirants may attempt to build nuclear arsenals regardless of other nations' commitment to achieving a nuclear-free world, initiating talks to achieve global zero would help galvanize the political will of all nations to fight proliferation in general, and help resolve the current proliferation crises involving North Korea and Iran in particular. The message to any country that seeks to acquire nuclear weapons must be clear: the international community is resolved to join together in the interests of our common security to eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide, and all nations must join in this urgent pursuit, with no exception.

In addition, nothing would do more to strengthen the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) than the initiation of global zero talks. The NPT enshrined the basic objective of the elimination of all nuclear weapons – the achievement of a global zero accord would represent the fulfillment of the NPT Article VI obligations.

We will continue to discuss this plan with key governments in the months ahead. We welcome all viewpoints and input. Ultimately, it will fall to political leaders to decide on a course. Ours is not the only possible approach, but we hope that the process we have outlined here serves as a useful framework and encourages an international dialogue among leaders, experts and the public on strategies for achieving global zero.

# PROCESS OUTLINE



#### Negotiate U.S.-Russia Cuts to 1,000 Warheads Each

- Following the conclusion of an agreement to replace the START I Treaty, the U.S. and Russia negotiate an accord for reductions of the total number of all categories of weapons down to 1,000 warheads per country (to be implemented by 2018).
  - Under this plan, the U.S. dismantling rate would gradually return from its current rate (350 warheads per year) to its historical average (1,000 warheads per year, 1960-2002), and the Russian dismantling rate would gradually return from its current rate (450 warheads per year) to its historical average (1,500 warheads per year).

#### **Prepare for Multilateral Negotiations**

- Earlier if possible, but not later than the ratification of the U.S.-Russia bilateral accord, all other nuclear weapons countries freeze the total number of warheads in their arsenals and commit to participate in multilateral negotiations for proportionate reductions of stockpiles (as outlined in Phase 2).
- Consultative conferences are periodically convened, including all nuclear weapons countries and key non-nuclear weapons countries, to provide updates on the U.S-Russia negotiations and to set the stage for the multilateral negotiations to follow.
- All nuclear weapons countries undertake technical preparation for multilateral negotiations, including conducting complete internal inventories of their nuclear warheads and materials, and developing and testing methods for verifying the storage, transport and dismantling of warheads.
- All nuclear capable countries move rapidly to cease nuclear explosive testing (sign/ratify CTBT) and the production of bomb-grade fissile materials (sign/ratify the FMCT), and to secure all bomb-grade fissile materials.
- Encourage de-alerting, minimizing first-use planning, establishing regional nuclear free zones and other measures conducive to progress toward global zero.



#### Negotiate and Ratify Multilateral Accord

- In a multilateral framework, the U.S. and Russia reach agreement to reduce to 500 total warheads each (to be implemented by 2021) as long as all other nuclear weapons countries agree to maintain the freeze on their stockpiles until 2018, followed by proportionate reductions until 2021. The legally binding international accord includes:
  - A requirement that all nuclear weapons countries sign and ratify the accord in order for it to enter into force.
  - The establishment, prior to the accord's entry into force, of a comprehensive verification and enforcement system to ensure the safe and verified dismantlement of nuclear warheads, the destruction or conversion to civilian use of warhead components and fissile materials, and compliance with the accord's obligations not to hide existing nuclear weapons or secretly build new ones. The system will build on decades of successful experience, including the verification of bilateral reductions in U.S. and Soviet/Russian arsenals, and the dismantling of nuclear weapons programs in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, South Africa, Libya and Iraq as well as on the experience verifying the new U.S.-Russia deep reductions called for in this plan. Indeed, even with today's limited monitoring, no country has ever produced a significant amount of bomb-grade materials (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) without detection by foreign intelligence. The verification and enforcement system includes:
    - A complete inventory, audit and inspection of delivery vehicles, nuclear warheads and fissile materials.
    - On-site, no-notice, challenge inspections that provide direct visual and forensic confirmation of the dismantlement of warheads and the absence of cheating (hidden warheads or secret manufacturing of weapons or materials).



- Expanded use of the most advanced monitoring technologies such as local and wide-area environmental sampling to remotely detect nuclear explosive materials, and satellite visible and thermal surveillance in order to detect facilities producing such materials.
- An agreed upon mechanism for resolving compliance disputes and, in the case of violations, enforcing compliance.

#### Strengthen Fuel Cycle Safeguards

- Concurrently with the negotiation of the multilateral accord, all nuclear capable countries develop and agree to the establishment of a comprehensive and universal system of safeguards on the civilian fuel cycle to prevent diversions of nuclear materials to build weapons. The plan includes:
  - For the first time, putting the entire fuel cycle of all countries under international safeguards, including uranium mining/milling, all reactors and all spent fuel.
  - The adoption of the IAEA "Additional Protocol" by all countries to allow for wideranging inspections for detecting undeclared nuclear material or activities.
  - The establishment of new safeguards that could include an international fuel bank and international fuel cycle management for uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.



#### Negotiate and Ratify Global Zero Accord

- Negotiate a global zero accord a legally binding international agreement which includes:
  - A schedule for phased, proportionate, verified reductions by all nuclear weapons countries to zero (0) total warheads by 2030.
    - All nuclear weapons countries reduce 2021 levels by 50 percent by 2025.
    - All countries reduce to zero (0) by 2030.
  - A requirement that all nuclear capable countries sign and ratify the agreement in order for it to enter into force (approximately 50 countries).
  - Accord opened for signature by all countries.
  - Continued implementation of the verification and enforcement system.



#### **Eliminate All Remaining Nuclear Warheads**

- All nuclear weapons countries complete the phased, proportionate, verified dismantlement of all nuclear warheads by 2030. This includes surplus warheads that, at the time of their decommissioning, would be moved into monitored storage, and then into verified dismantling facilities under multilateral surveillance.
- Continued implementation of the verification and enforcement system prohibiting the development and possession of nuclear weapons.

# CLOSING

In sum, recognizing the political and technical complexity of the effort, this four-phased end-toend plan projects 14 years (2010-23) to reach a global zero accord on effective measures for eliminating nuclear weapons – including preparation, negotiation, ratification and entry into force – and at least an additional seven years (2024-2030) to complete the dismantlement of all nuclear warheads.

For point of reference:

The average time taken to negotiate and sign previous major nuclear arms agreements is four years – six months for START II (1993); two and one-half years for SALT I (1972) and for the ABM Treaty (1972); four and one-half years for SALT II (1979); six years for the INF Treaty (1987); and nine years for START I (1991).

Regarding the projected rate of dismantlement, over the past 20 years (1989-2009), the United States and Russia retired and destroyed twice as many nuclear warheads (40,000-plus) as this action plan proposes (20,000-plus) over the next 20 years (2009-2030). [See Figure 1.]




Figure 1.